

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07  
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01  
SAJ-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 /095 W  
-----241753Z 025011 /46

R 241726Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4993  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 01381

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: SPD MAKES POSITION MORE PRECISE

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JAN. 19 BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON  
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE SPD CLARIFIED SOMEWHAT ITS  
POSITION ON MBFR AND INDICATED IT WAS STILL INTERESTED  
IN SYMBOLIC FORCE REDUCTIONS THIS YEAR WHICH WERE NOT  
PERCEIVED AS A SECURITY RISK. THE SPD SAID ITS POSITION  
WAS NOT AT VARIANCE WITH THAT OF THE ALLIANCE. THE  
CDU/CSU REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE POSITION  
AND CHARGED THAT RECENT SPD COMMENTS ABOUT MBFR HAD CAST  
DOUBT UPON THE POSITION OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG. IT IS  
NOT CLEAR WHAT SPECIFIC ACTION THE SPD NOW CONTEMPLATES,  
BUT WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT MUCH WILL HAPPEN UNTIL  
A SALT II AGREEMENT IS IN THE OFFING AND THE CHANCELLOR  
HAS HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE PRES-  
IDENT. END SUMMARY.

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1. SPD DEPUTY AND MBFR EXPERT PAWELCZYK CARRIED THE  
PRINCIPAL BURDEN IN THE DEBATE FOR EXPLAINING WHAT SPD  
CHAIRMAN BRANDT HAD REALLY MEANT IN PAST REMARKS ABOUT  
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. PAWELCZYK SAID THAT BOTH SIDES  
HAD DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR INTEREST IN CONTINUING THE  
TALKS AND PERCEIVED MORE CLEARLY NOW THAN IN 1973 THE

PROBLEMS AND THE LIMITS OF THE NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE. MOREOVER, HE POINTED OUT, BOTH SIDES HAD MOVED SOMEWHAT TOWARD ONE ANOTHER.

2. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT ABOUT MOVEMENT TOWARD ONE ANOTHER, PAWELCZYK REFERRED TO THE FEBRUARY 19 EASTERN PROPOSAL WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, SIGNED MOVEMENT TOWARD NATO'S TWO-PHASE CONCEPT. HE ILLUSTRATED NATO MOVEMENT BY REFERRING TO THE OFFER TO BEGIN PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN 18 MONTHS AND TO INCLUDE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE TWO CUTS. PAWELCZYK SAID THAT THE EASTERN TABBING OF DATA HAD OPENED THE DOOR FOR CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS AND GIVEN A POLITICAL SIGNAL, I.E., THAT OF MEETING THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR SUCH FIGURES. HE REFERRED TO THE DISCREPANCY OF APPROXIMATELY 150,000 MEN IN THE FIGURES AND NOTED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEARED UP IN THE DATA DISCUSSION.

3. PAWELCZYK SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL NOW TO INTRODUCE NEW PROPOSALS IN VIENNA LOADED WITH TECHNICAL DETAILS. RATHER, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN AS TO WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED FOR A FIRST AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH POSITIONS.

4. PAWELCZYK ARGUED THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS OF U.S. AND SOVIET TROOPS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO'S PROPOSAL, EMPHASIZING HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT PARITY REDUCTIONS. HE NOTED THAT MODEST LIMITATIONS ON CONFIDENTIAL

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NATIONAL FORCES WERE NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH NATIONAL CEILINGS.

5. PAWELCZYK ARGUED THERE HAD BEEN NO SPD MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE NATO POSITION OF APPROXIMATE PARITY AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID HE AGREED THAT NATIONAL REDUCTION QUOTAS MUST BE DETERMINED WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES, EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT SUCH QUOTAS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED INFORMALLY TO THE OTHER SIDE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET IN THE WEST UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND WOULD EVENTUALLY SHOW UP IN DEFENSE BUDGET SUBMISSIONS.

6. PAWELCZYK INDICATED THAT THE POLITICAL MEANING OF THE EASTERN TABBING OF DATA WAS THAT THE EAST, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HAD GIVEN FIGURES REGARDING ITS OWN STRENGTH, AND, SECOND, WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM. HE THOUGHT THE WEST SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THE EAST HAD GIVEN A POLITICAL SIGNAL WITH ITS FIGURES WHICH APPROACHED PARITY

WITH THOSE OF THE WEST. THIS RAISED THE QUESTION,  
ACCORDING TO PAWELCZYK, WHETHER THE EAST HAD SIGNED

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SAJ-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 NRC-05 /095 W  
-----241751Z 025073 /46

R 241726Z JAN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4994  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 01381

ITS UNDERSTANDING THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE MUST REST ON  
APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO BLOCS.

7. SINCE THE DATA DISCUSSION WILL TAKE A LOT OF TIME,  
PAWELCZYK THOUGHT EAST AND WEST SHOULD CON-  
SIDER WHETHER THEY COULD NOT AGREE ON A FIRST SMALL  
REDUCTION STEP, PROVIDED IT LEFT UNTOUCHED THE COMMON  
CEILING CONCEPT.

8. PAWELCZYK POINTED OUT THAT WESTERN ESTIMATES OF  
WARSAW PACT STRENGTH, AT LEAST THEORETICALLY, STOOD UNDER  
THE RESERVATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION.  
HE SAID ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WERE POSSIBLE ONLY WHERE  
ASYMMETRIES EXISTED, AND EVEN THE NATO DEMAND FOR SUCH  
REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING DEPENDED UPON THE  
RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. PAWELCZYK ALSO NOTED  
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THAT THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS MUST ASSURE THAT THEIR NEGOTIATORS DO NOT STRAY INTO A NEGOTIATING THICKET DURING THE DATA DISCUSSION.

9. PAWELCZYK CONCLUDED HIS ARGUMENTS WITH THE THOUGHT THAT A LIMITED REDUCTION OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT CREATE A SECURITY RISK, BUT RATHER WOULD SIGNIFY AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SPD DID NOT ADVOCATE ADVANCE CONCESSIONS ON MBFR.

10. CDU DEPUTY MERTES CARRIED THE ATTACK AGAIN FOR THE OPPOSITION AS HE HAD LAST MONTH. MERTES STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE CDU/CSU STOOD BY THE ALLIANCE POSITION. MOREOVER, THE OPPOSITION DEMANDED THAT IT NOT BE MANEUVERED INTO A POSITION IN WHICH THE CLARITY AND UNIFORMITY OF THE POSITION OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG WAS ENDANGERED. MERTES POINTED OUT THAT THE CDU/CSU SUPPORTED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, DID NOT WANT THE FRG TO "GO IT ALONE" ON MBFR, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION IN VIENNA WAS NOT AN "EXPERTS" BUT RATHER A "POLITICAL" POSITION.

11. COMMENT: THE SPD HAS MAINTAINED THE POSITION THAT IT WOULD LIKE TO MOVE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD THIS YEAR WITH SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, ASSUMING THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT CAN BE RETAINED AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE POINT WAS ALSO MADE THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ASYMMETRICAL IF, IN FACT, FORCE LEVELS WERE ASYMMETRICAL. THE SPD HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT TOO WANTED TO PROTECT THE BUNDESWEHR FROM A NATIONAL SUB-CEILING AND AGREED THAT THE RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES MUST DETERMINE THE REDUCTION QUOTAS.

WHILE THE CLARIFIED SPD POSITION IS CONSIDERABLY CLOSER TO NATO'S -- WITH THE MAJOR EXCEPTION THAT THE

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ALLIANCE WANTS LARGE, MILITARILY MEANINGFUL FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS -- IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SPD VIEWS SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS A PRINCIPAL MEANS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. SINCE THE ALLIANCE HAS PREVIOUSLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE SPD CAN OR WILL DO TO CAUSE A REVIEW OF THE FRG'S OWN POSITION. BOTH THE FOREIGN AND

DEFENSE MINISTERS STRONGLY REAFFIRMED THAT POSITION  
RECENTLY, AND IT MAY BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE  
FDP PARTNER GENSCHER THAT GERMAN INTERESTS CAN BEST BE  
SERVED BY A NEW FRG APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.  
NEITHER GENSCHER NOR LEBER HAD ANYTHING TO SAY ON MBFR  
DURING LAST WEEK'S DEBATE, AND THE CHANCELLOR MERELY  
REFERRED TO THE TALKS, TOGETHER WITH SALT, AS A  
CONTINUATION OF DETENTE POLICY. SINCE THE CHANCELLOR  
CONTINUED TO SUBORDINATE MBFR TO SALT, WE CONSIDER IT  
UNLIKELY THAT HE -- OR SPD CHAIRMAN BRANDT -- WILL  
UNDERTAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE UNTIL THE U.S. HAS ACHIEVED  
MORE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SALT II AGREEMENT AND SCHMIDT  
HAS HAD A CHANCE TO CONSULT BILATERALLY WITH PRESIDENT  
CARTER.  
STOESSEL

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## Message Attributes

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